Introduction

The existence of economic human rights is asserted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the United Nations in 19410. Of its thirty articles, five clearly refer to economic rights (Articles 17, 22, 23, 24 and 25).¹ These five articles declare the right to own property (Article 17); the the right to social security (Article 22); the right to work, protection against unemployment, freedom from discrimination, just remuneration and right to form trade unions (Article 23); right to leisure (Article 24); and the right to a decent standard of living (Article 25). Few would doubt that these are laudable goals, but their existence as human rights is another issue altogether. What is the basis of claiming these as "rights"? Are there any real "economic human rights" which have the same status of the more widely accepted set of civil and political "human rights"?

The assertion of the existence of "human rights" is distinct from the statement of desirable goals, for goals are delimited by time and place, defined by the context in which they are advocated. For rights to be truly "human rights," they must be universal, independent of time, place and context. Human rights must be distinct from other rights, such as one's rights as a father, as a college professor, or as an adult American citizen. These rights are defined by position and are not universal. Thus, a right to unemployment compensation cannot be a "natural" or "universal" right, since it is limited to those with employment experience. This is true for civil and political human rights, and it therefore must be true of economic human rights.

The backbone of the idea of "human rights" has always been the recognition of a moral law that is distinct from positive law. Positive law refers to government created statutes. These are obviously defined by context, and limited by time and place. Positive law is based solely on the authority of the state. Moral law, or, as it is more commonly called, natural law, is, like Hebrew National Hot Dogs, based on a higher authority: morality, justice and ultimately God's law (although this would be difficult to define and defend in our secular and multi-cultural society). Ultimately, the existence of human rights comes down to value judgments, which are, by necessity, based on faith, and on a vision of human nature, society and reality.

This paper will adhere to the following format: After this introduction, the paper will look at the common origins of orthodox economic theory and the secular idea of human rights. The following section will examine orthodox economic theory and Catholic social thought as normative systems, concentrating on the values that underlie each system of thought. The next section looks at how the two systems define and understand society and the individual. In that section we will argue that Catholic social thought 1) is a better depiction of reality; and 2) offers a strong basis for human rights. In the final section, we will examine the economic human rights as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to see which are truly universal rights based on the nature of humans and society, and which are merely statements of desirable outcomes.

SHARED ORIGINS OF ECONOMICS AND "RIGHTS"

The connection between the idea of the existence of "rights" and economics is longstanding. One way that this connection is made evident is in Ian Shapiro's excellent book, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory (19106). In the book, Shapiro categorizes the history of his subject (the idea of "rights") into four periods: transition, classical, neo-classical and Keynesian, the last three of which are based on the classifications of the major schools of mainstream economic theory. The idea of "rights" played a very important role in the development of economic theory.

Modern economic theory, like the idea of human rights, owes its existence to the idea of natural rights. This point should not be controversial and will not be belabored here. Yet the idea of human rights and economic theory have both shed, at least formally, the natural law and natural rights underpinning which was so essential to the founding and development of both concepts. The preconceptions of natural law still persist in modern economics and in the rhetoric of human rights. Yet the consistent and accepted philosophical underpinning of each has since been lost. Moreover, in both cases the philosophical underpinnings have not been adequately replaced. Hence, the problematic nature of both economic theory and human rights discourse. The main support for each is the fear of examining the inherent weaknesses of these foundations.

Although both economic theory and the idea of human rights are, in many ways, ancient in their origins, we can date the origins of the modern conception of each to 1776, the year of publication for The Declaration of Independence and An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. When Thomas Jefferson wrote: "We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," he had as his conception of the social order the 110th century notion of the natural order and the existence of natural rights. Without this preconception, Jefferson's assertion would not only be unintelligible to the audience he was addressing, it would have been nonsense. The belief in a Divine Providence that has established a "natural order" in the social universe, which is comparable to the observed natural order discovered by Newton and other scientists in the natural universe, is the starting point for economic science as well as the modern conception of human rights. This assumption included three key provisions: that a natural social order existed; that this order promoted human happiness; and, lastly, that this order was created by forces

inherent in human nature. Without these assumptions, the notion of individual liberties is inherently dangerous, and Thomas Hobbes' idea that "the condition of man...is a condition of war of everyone against everyone" would almost certainly exist.

This same natural order preconception is dominant in the works of Adam Smith. This is especially the case in Smith's advocacy of a society of perfect liberty, an economy free of the constraints of government regulation and control. One of the main messages of Smith's Wealth of Nations was that there existed a natural order in the economy, an order that asserted itself free of government design or intervention. These two works (The Declaration of Independence and The Wealth of Nations) share much more than a publishing date, for they share the belief in a natural order, natural law and the existence of natural rights. For both, this order and these laws and rights flow from God. Yet for both, it is also the working out of the inherent nature of humans. Such an order does not come from being imposed from above, but springs from the inner "nature" of all individuals. Without this view of human nature, neither the free market economy nor democracy could have been seen as workable systems. We must remember that both were suggesting social formations for which there were no real empirical examples.²

It is unfortunate that Smith's Wealth of Nations is understood without the insights of his earlier masterpiece, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. If one reads only selective passages of The Wealth of Nations it is possible to come away with the view that society is held together magically by selfishness. Smith's earlier work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, starts off by stating, "However selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it" (Smith 1976a, p. 9). In this book, Smith argues that human behavior is guided by the "sympathy principle" and not self-interest. The apparent contradiction between The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments disappears when one realizes that each book is dealing with different levels of sociality. The Theory of Moral Sentiments is about how the individual becomes socialized into the rules and norms of society. The Wealth of Nations is about how an economy populated with individuals who are socialized into the norms and morals of a society can provide for an orderly and efficient economy. It is Smith's assumption of sociality and civility that allows so much individual economic freedom, with the following of "self-interest" promoting the common good. Although part of the positive effects of "self-interested" actions on the common good stems from the institutional set-up of a free market economy, much of it stems from the self-restraint provided by the workings of the "sympathy principle." Smith writes of the "sacred rights of private property" (WN, 1103) and of the coordination role of the "invisible hand" and how it provides both efficiency and equity (see especially TMS, 1104-5). The ultimate argument is that such a system is naturally designed by Providence to promote the common good.

Under the influence of Jeremy Bentham, efficiency eventually becomes the sole criteria of judgment. He criticized the idea of natural rights, writing that "Right is a child of law; from real laws come real rights, but from imaginary law, from natural laws,' come imaginary rights...Natural rights is simple nonsense; natural and imprescriptible rights (an American phrase) rhetorical nonsense, nonsense on stilts" (quoted in Cranston, 1973, p. 13).³ Bentham also held firmly to the belief that laws and regularities regulated the social universe in the same manner as the natural universe. Bentham objected to natural rights in the legal arena as they conflicted with his reformism. He thus kept the natural law idea of a natural social order (the economy as an equilibrium system) yet he abandoned the essence of the natural law, that there existed a higher moral law upon which positive law must be based. He, in effect, replaced morality and justice with the new God of efficiency.

Bentham's lasting influence in economics is his mechanistic view of human nature. It is from Bentham that we get the "rational economic man" conception of human nature. In Bentham's famous words (quoted in Clark 1992, p. 98):

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign

masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we

ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand

the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and

effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we

say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection,

will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may

pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it

all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and

assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear

the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which

attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead

of reason, in darkness instead of light.

It is clear from this famous quotation that the natural and the moral are equated and that man is controlled by natural laws, natural laws that are also moral dictates. Bentham's utilitarian philosophy formed the foundation of the marginal utility theory of value, the cornerstone of neoclassical economics. Given such a conception of human nature, the criteria for evaluating social outcomes became efficiency. The early Utilitarian ideal of promoting the greatest happiness for the greatest number was replaced with maximizing production and consumption.

ECONOMIC THEORY AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AS NORMATIVE SYSTEMS

Orthodox economists will no doubt hotly contest the contention that both Catholic social thought and economic theory are normative systems. For over a century the economics profession has gone to great lengths to argue that economics is a "positive" and value-free science. A close examination of this claim reveals that economics is, and has to be, a normative endeavor and that all the posturing about "positive" economics is merely an attempt to dress up one set of value judgments as "scientific fact" while ignoring any other value premises.

In the first week of classes, every first-year economics student learns of the distinction between "positive" and "normative" economics. "Positive" economics deals with what is, and is thus value-free, while "normative" economics deals with what ought to be, and thus involves value judgments. It is by adhering to this distinction that economists have made the case that their analysis is "scientific." A detailed examination of the positive/normative distinction is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a few points need to be made. First, it is a totally false dichotomy, and has been recognized as such by methodologists for some time. As Gunnar Myrdal long ago noted, all economic theory and observation is value-laden and cannot be otherwise (Myrdal 1954; 19510). Even the simplest observation requires a viewpoint from which to observe, and this viewpoint is not, and cannot be, based solely on past "objective" observation. All observation requires theory to help bring "order" to the chaos of daily life. We need a theoretical system to assimilate and give meaning to our observations. Theories and models help us to categorize reality, but these categories are humanly created and are always based on value judgments. This is not a radical point, and most, if not all, philosophers and historians of science would readily accept it. Only economists seem, as a group, to reject this fact.

Just as all observation requires theory, all theories require value judgments. At the most basic level, these are the judgments of what to observe and what to theorize about. A theory of unemployment must first start by making the decision that unemployment needs theoretical explanation and, second, it must define unemployment; both are blatantly value-laden (and political) activities. ⁴ Furthermore, what methods to use to investigate this phenomenon also involves value judgments, as does the critical criteria about what will be accepted as the "final term" in the analysis, the basis of what arguments will or will not be accepted. Most importantly, values and value judgments enter into theory construction on the ground floor by giving the theorist the "vision" of the reality they are attempting to explain. This "vision" is pre-analytical in the sense that it exists before theoretical activity takes place. It comes from the theorist's philosophical preconceptions and is often unknown to the theorist, as it is accepted as true without itself being subject to investigation. It is most often a reflection of the theorists' view of the "ideal" of what they are investigating. Thus, in social theory the "vision" is a mere reflection, sometimes clear, sometimes distorted, of the theorist's opinion of the ideal society. ⁵ Adam Smith's "society of perfect liberty" is the most obvious example of this point, but we could easily use Jeremy Bentham's "Utilitarianism," or Leon Walras' system of general equilibrium. In fact, these three "visions" make up much of the neoclassical economist's preconceptions of the economy and society. They are accepted without investigation or inquiry. All legitimate theory (accepted by the mainstream of the profession) must be in conformity with these presuppositions. They provide the definition of society, of human nature and the moral justification of a market economy. And all have been shown quite clearly to be heavily based on values and value judgments. The ideal always influences the real. The ideal provides the framework on how we will understand the real. And since humans create their reality, and since they strive for the ideal, the ideal, as a goal, influences the development of the real. ⁶

The extent to which ideology and "values" have influenced the development of economic theory over its history has been well documented and need not be repeated here (see especially Myrdal, 1954). All economics, as with all social science, is normative and cannot help being otherwise. The claim of the "positive" scientific label is more an attempt to dress up one set of value judgments as "scientific" so that they do not get examined and are not subject to criticism. Just rereading the quotation from Bentham shows how, at its most basic philosophical principle, neoclassical economics is pursuing both a positive and normative agenda.

"In the classical and much of the neoclassical tradition in economics, the maximal satisfaction of wants, notably consumer wants, has been and remains the basic criterion of judgment, the standard of value, the basis on which to distinguish between good and bad, proper and improper, and desirable and undesirable" (Tool 19106, p. 109). ⁷ In orthodox economics, value comes from and is measured by utility. As Joan Robinson (1962, p. 47) has noted: "Utility is a metaphysical concept of impregnable circularity; utility is the quality in commodities that makes individuals want to buy them, and the fact that individuals want to buy commodities shows that they have utility." The theory of marginal utility serves both of the functions of value theory: the ordering properties of society and the legitimization and evaluation of ends (Clark 1995). For the neoclassical economist something has value only insofar as it delivers utility to someone through the marketplace. The marketplace sums the total individual utilities of consumers and balances these against the disutilities of producers (demand and supply) and reaches an equilibrium when these are equal. The underlying order of the market (which for neoclassical economics is society) is an expression of society's values. Economists often note that utility can be had outside of market transactions, but this is seen as a market failure and leads to inefficiencies. Thus, they view the solution to all problems, economic or otherwise, as involving the establishment of property rights and a market for exchange.

The Catholic social thought tradition does not make any claim of being "value-free." In fact, it explicitly states its value premises. An understanding of the economy, and thus economic human rights, based on Catholic social thought would replace the "utilitarian" and "laissez-faire" values with more justifiable moral grounding. The U.S. Bishops' "Economic Justice for All" clearly lays out the fundamental principles or values upon which the economy should be understood: 1) every economic decision and institution must be judged in light of whether it protects or undermines the dignity of the human person; 2) human dignity can be realized and protected only in community; 3) all people have a right to participate in the economic life of society; 4) all members of society have a special obligation to the poor and vulnerable; 5) human rights are the minimum condition for life in community; and 6) society, as a whole, acting through public and private institutions, has the moral responsibility to enhance human dignity and protect human rights (O'Brien and Shannon, 1992, p. 575). The two major themes of Catholic social thought are the protection of the human dignity of the individual and the promotion of the common good. These two exist not as separate standards or goals, but as inseparable criteria. Neither can be truly pursued without the other. We cannot promote the common good and not at the same time protect the human dignity of the individual.

These two contrary values systems will necessarily lead to differing explanations of social phenomena; specifically, what is society and human nature? We now turn to these two issues.

CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY AND HUMAN NATURE

The existence of universal human rights presupposes a view of human nature and society that not only allows and promotes such rights, but also requires them. If human rights are, in fact, universal, then they must be a necessary aspect of what it is to be human and to live as humans are meant to live in human society. It is in their respective conceptions of human nature and society that orthodox economic theory and Catholic social thought differ most. And it is here that we find that Catholic social thought provides a justification and moral basis for economic human rights, something that is missing in orthodox economics.

ECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS

The only justification of economic human rights under Bentham's, and modern neoclassical economic theorists' view of the world is on the grounds that such rights promote economic efficiency. Thus, the only valid economic human rights will be any that play an essential role on the efficient operation of the market.

SUBSISTENCE AND PARTICIPATION

Articles 22-25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights refer to the right of social security, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to social participation. These articles recognize the need of economic subsistence to

human life and the need and duty to contribute to the community.

The treatment questions like this receive in orthodox economic theory is that economic security and the attainment of any standard of living are a function of how one competes in the marketplace, and is necessarily so. The classical economists' (especially David Ricardo and Thomas Robert Malthus) survival of the fittest attitude earned economics the nickname "the dismal science." In classical economics, one of the essential adjustments necessary to move the economy from a disequilibrium situation to an equilibrium position involves adjustments in the labor market which entailed rises and falls in mortality rates and population levels. The notion of social security is anathema to economics because it provides income for those who cannot be productive and reduces the incentives of those who are potentially productive. At best, the orthodox economist can assert that a competitive market economy can provide the maximum level of production, allowing for higher levels of living and wider attainment of adequate standards of living. Yet mechanisms which allow for non-market redistribution of incomes are contrary to orthodox economic theory.¹⁶

Catholic social thought is very strong on the need for all in society to share in the social product. There are two reasons for this. Humans need to subsist in order to live and flourish; a point that is fairly obvious. This comes directly from the nature of the human person. Yet the sharing of social output is also tied to the social nature of the process of production, in which all play a role even if it is not one recognized in a market transaction. The mother who cares for her children is contributing greatly to society and is promoting the common good. Yet the market, which needs her efforts greatly, attaches no value to her work. This is true of countless activities in the social economy, which are necessary for any economy and society to prosper. Furthermore, the call for "just wages" and the support for labor unions in Catholic social thought reflect this social nature of production by providing mechanisms for a wider sharing of the benefits of social production. Yet the assertion of a right to an adequate standard of living has with it the right, and the duty, for social participation. "Social justice implies that persons have an obligation to be active and productive participants in the life of society and that society has a duty to enable them to participate in this way" (Ibid., p. 595). Here we see a clear statement of the need to meet human needs and the need for all to contribute to society.

CONCLUSION

The assertion of universal economic rights requires a grounding in nature of society and the human person. Such rights must be required for the full development of the human person. If one starts with the conception of human nature and the mechanistic view of society that underlies orthodox economic theory, than one could not assert the existence of economic human rights. You can justify private property, but your justification is more an economic rationale of positive law (the need to promote economic efficiency) than a human right supported by moral or natural law. If the universal problem of scarcity were solved, the case for private property would wither away.

Catholic social thought does provide the foundation of the existence of economic human rights. These rights are grounded in the essential attributes of the nature of the human being and society. Furthermore, Catholic social thought is grounded in a more realistic understanding of the economy and society. It is more realistic not only for the obvious reasons, that it places humans in the context of God's plan for us, but more realistic in that its view of human nature is closer to observed human behavior, and its view of society corresponds to actual societies. But, most importantly, it asserts the basic human fact--a fact of humanity--that the economy is here to serve humankind and not the other way around.