This paper examines the primary set of standards in the human rights debate, from the point of view of whether the Declaration of Human Rights is truly universally applicable or whether it is a flawed document that merely reflects the political realities of the mid-twentieth century. The major objections to the universality of the Declaration can be classified into two groups—the cultural domination argument, that the Declaration is an expression of Western, male-dominated states, and the ideological argument, that it follows the developmental imperatives of the imperialist and developed Western states. These objections, and their impact on human rights issues will be examined in detail. Our author argues that the Declaration itself is a working and living document that sets standards towards which a nation can strive. It needs to be broadened to recognize and inculcate respect of all persons as human beings. It is a tool for teaching and a means of promoting tolerance and respect for all human beings.

The principle of the protection of human rights is derived from the concept of

man as a person and his relationship with society which cannot be separated

from universal human nature. Then, existence of human rights, does not

depend on the will of a state, neither internally on its law or any other

legislative measure, nor internationally on treaty or custom in which the

express or tacit will of a state constitutes the essential element. A state or states

are not capable of creating human rights by convention; they can only confirm

the existence and give them protection. The role of the state is no more than

declaratory. - Justice Tanaka, as a member of the International Court of Justice in the

South West Africa cases in 1966.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The development of human society has raised a number of definitional questions, the resolution of which has led to drastic changes in the way human beings perceive, and therefore organize, themselves. The debate on the question of rights in society has always revolved around issues of participation in community life. The primary distinction made is between human life and all other forms; then humans make finer distinctions in terms of which group (or groups) is allowed to set the rules according to

* Dr. Balakrishnan holds a Ph.D. in Government and International Studies from the University of Notre Dame,

M.A. and B.A. in Political Science from the University of Bombay. Her research and teaching interests are International Law, Global Environmental Politics, Environment and Development, International Organization, and Peace and Justice Studies. She has published papers both in the US and India and presented at many professional conferences. Her most recent publication is “Sustainable Development: The Need for a Coordinated Multilevel Approach Towards a Multigenerational Goal,” in Global Aid, a United Nations Publication. She teaches in the Graduate Division of St. John's College of Arts and Sciences.

which society is governed. Thus, who is allowed to participate in governance is usually a good indicator of what rights a person has in that society.

There is evidence of the debate on human rights in the literature of ancient societies, but until the development of the modern state the question of “right” was seen solely in terms of the fulfillment of potential in a human being within his/her society. For the Hindus it was a question of fulfilling one's dharma—doing the right thing, (or the ability to do the right thing) in order to become a complete human being. For Aristotle,

the question of right was founded on telos, or the unfolding of the human being towards a pre-determined natural “good.” Later, in the medieval Christian traditions, this was expressed by St. Thomas Aquinas as natural law. 1 This natural law tradition continues to shape international law especially in the use of “general principles” as a source of international law (see discussion of general principles later in paper).

With the Renaissance came the emphasis on the individual as a creative and autonomous being and the emergence of the modern state from the medieval kingdoms whose identity was related to the Church, and whose claim power lay in the Divine Right of Kings. With the writings of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau however, the emphasis on the individual as having rights against a state grew stronger, simply because these philosophers believed that individual rights flowed from the state of nature that existed prior to the state itself.2 Hobbes' Leviathan gained power from the contract between Hobbes himself and the people who were tired of living a “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” life. Yet, even though the Leviathan had near absolute control over people's lives, the origin of that authority lay with the people.

With Locke and Rousseau, the role of the people, and therefore their power over the government, grew greater. The first contract according to Locke was between the people themselves, to organize a civil society. The ruler was a creation of the second contract and existed only at the will of the people. Rousseau went a step further in that he argued that natural liberty was inalienable from, or even by, man since all men are “born free.” 3 The American Revolution, anchored on the ideas of Locke and Jefferson, led to the creation of the Bill of Rights, one of the documents that best expresses the Western conception of “rights of man” framed against the state, and of natural law translated into a written constitution. 4

The challenge to the state itself came from Marx and Engels, who saw it as the means of oppression by the capitalist classes. Marx's cry “Working men of all countries unite,” 5 is significant for two reasons. Apart from the threat this posed to the dominant class, this call for unity across state boundaries also heightened awareness of an international system where people mattered. Prior to mid-nineteenth century, it was only the rich and the political elite who could, and did, travel to other states; the average person had very little knowledge of life outside his/her own nation-state. Now, people could hold their own states to a slowly developing international standard that expressed itself, a century later, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, also called Declaration). 6

Human Rights Conventions as General Principles of International Law or Jus Cogens

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights represents the recognition that there are certain rights that human beings have simply by virtue of being human, which no state can alienate under any circumstances. This Declaration, which sets the standards for the

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treatment of individuals across the international system, is accepted as an integral part of the body of international law today. While there is very little political debate on the need for standards of human behavior per se, the question of the universality of the Declaration itself is raised on two grounds. One criticism is that the Declaration is not broad enough to be universal. Such arguments are heard from some feminist scholars and from within the debate on the hierarchy of rights. The other criticism comes from the cultural relativists who state that it is impossible to create a set of standards that transcend culture.

However, before addressing the critics, one must understand the status of the Declaration today, by examining the relevance of international law in the present nation-state system, and the status of human rights as an issue area within international law. von Glahn defines international law as “a body of principles, customs, and rules recognized as effectively binding obligations by sovereign states and such other entities as have been granted international personality” and adds that “the law is also increasingly applicable to individuals in their relationship with states.” 7

One important aspect of international law that is of supreme relevance to the human rights debate is that nation states are both the creators and the subjects of international law and, as such, cannot be bound by laws to which they do not specifically agree. Also, although the power to enforce the international mandate is growing (witness the actions in Iraq) there is still a wide gap between the statement of international law and its practice. Unlike domestic law, international law suffers from the lack of a dominant authority which can set standards and enforce them.

While there is no single corpus of international law, Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice outlines the sources from which such law is derived.

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

(a)
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b)
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c)
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decision and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 8

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights falls into the category of general principles of international law and, as such, has a much more ambiguous position in international law than do treaties or even customs. There are differing interpretations of the meaning of “general principles in international law.” 9 One view states that these are merely commonalties found among the established and existing judicial principles of the nation-states, while the other view argues that these principles are derived from natural law. In either case, given that there is no single central authority in the international system, the acceptance of these principles depends upon public attitudes towards their legitimacy. Further, the Declaration itself is a Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly and, as such, it is merely a recommendation.10

Another view on the status of human rights in international law, however, narrows the scope of state interpretation of the Declaration by arguing that these are part of jus cogens, or, peremptory norms. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties defines jus cogens as “a peremptory norm of general international law [which] is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” 11

UNIVERSAL VS. RELATIVIST ARGUMENTS

West vs. East - The Cultural Arguments

One of the major arguments used by scholars who challenge the universality of the Declaration of Human Rights today flows from a culturally relativist perspective. While a few scholars argue that there are no universal norms that transcend cultures, others make a convincing case for the equal validity of all cultures. Even as the Declaration was being framed, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association warned that it would be “a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and America,” adding that “standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive” and “what is held to be a human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people.” 12 This view was supported by the conservative communalists who promote the view that “different cultures understand human life and construct its essential properties in totally different ways.” Thus they reject the human rights standards that they claim create “alienating, individualistic effects in the community.” 13 Some of the strongest critics of a universal set of human rights come from within the Islamic culture.

Islamic Approaches to Human Rights and International Law

The view of society and state in Islam is very different from that of the West. In Islam there is no religion/state dichotomy and “Muslim society [is] regulated through religious norms that defined a pious society, an upright rule, and a just order.” There is also no conception of individual rights set up against the state simply because everyone is equally subordinate to the shari'a, or religious law. 14

There are a number of areas where the Islamic culture comes into conflict with the universal application of the Declaration. These include the subjugation of women, the inferior status of non-Islamic minorities (kafirs), and the criminalization of conversion from Islam according to the shari'a.15 The last position explicitly violates article 18 of the Declaration.16 Saudi Arabia abstained from voting on the Declaration precisely because of disagreements with this article.17

Yet, one must be careful when using the term “Islamic culture” in this debate because the cultural norms across the various Islamic states themselves are not the same. As Reza Afshari states:

…cultural circumstances conducive to political expression of Islamization

vary greatly from one country to another. Whereas in Sudan there might

be deeper historical roots for political Islamization, the cultural patterns

that might lend support in such major metropolitan areas as Baghdad or

Tehran are far more complex. For one thing, they are often hostile to the

imposition of shari'a rules, especially the canonical hudud punishments

(stoning and amputation of limbs).18

Islamic resentment of “Western cultural domination” is worsened by articles like those of Richard Cohen, who goes so far as to argue that, in spite of being democratically elected, a government dominated by Islamic fundamentalists would by its very existence militate against human rights, especially the rights of women and minorities.19 Statements like these send mixed messages to non-Western and non-Christian states by appearing to change the standards which are used to test the level of human rights in a society (see discussion later in the paper on the hierarchy of rights).

Gender 20 and Human Rights

Another strong set of criticisms of the UDHR comes from within the gender debate. The differences in the perception of the effectiveness of the Declaration make for an interesting case within the relativist argument. There are two major approaches within the gender category.21 The first calls for an expansion of the “Universal” Declaration of Human Rights to cover issues that affect women. Proponents of the second approach argue that there can be no universal rights because experiences of men and women are meaningful within a cultural context and that transcultural rights are an impossibility.

Feminist scholars taking the first approach argue that the international system, dominated as it is by nation-states, suffers from the same patriarchal behavior patterns that affect these states. International law therefore expresses the interests of the men who control the politics in the states. Few women are visible in the organizational structures of states or of international organizations. Further, as Charlesworth, et. al. put it,

States are patriarchal structures not only because they exclude women

from elite positions and decision making roles, but also because they are

based on the concentration of power in, and control by, an elite, and the

domestic legitimation of a monopoly over the use of force to maintain

that control. This foundation is reinforced by international legal principles

of sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity and

the legitimation of force to defend those attributes.22

Further, states guarding their sovereignty very jealously do not allow the penetration of international law into issues that are considered part of their domestic jurisdiction.23 Since most issues that concern women are placed in this category, and are deemed to be the domain of private or national law, 24 women have little or no recourse to the UDHR or to any of the associated conventions.25 One example that Charlesworth and Chinkin give is the Convention against Torture in which torture is limited to behavior that is “at the instigation of” a public official. Thus any kind of abuse of women within a private situation is clearly outside the ambit of this Convention.26

There have been a number of criticisms of this attempt to broaden the scope of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. People who advocate the maintenance of the state-based system of international law argue that moving a large sphere of issues from domestic jurisdiction into the international arena will necessarily lead to imperialism, both ideological and political.27 Another fear, especially among human rights activists, is that the expansion of the scope of the Declaration will lead to the dilution in its application. When one examines the supplementary Conventions that expand on the intentions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is patently obvious that there is a dramatic decrease in support.28 Yet, the progress of the movement towards universality is seen in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, (CEDAW) which entered into force in 1981.

The cultural relativism approach to gender and human rights militates against the setting of universal standards. This approach is anti-essentialist, demanding that womens' issues be seen within the context of the culture rather than as problems facing women in general. Thus, a cultural relativist would argue that there can be no common ground between the issues facing a white middle class professional woman in the United Kingdom and those facing a trokosi slave woman in Ghana. Hence, there can be no single universal set of rights that encompass even all women, let alone all human beings. Proponents of this approach see any attempt at creating and maintaining a universal standard as cultural imperialism and a process dominated by Western males.

There are a number of criticisms of this approach also. The most obvious one is that radical cultural relativism leaves human beings with no legal shelter..29 Another criticism is that, by refusing universal standards and focusing solely on cultural issues, the relativists commit the same mistakes as the essentialist feminists except that they do so on the basis of culture. With all culturally relativist positions there is the assumption that “culture” has the same meaning for all individuals within it and that this culture promotes the fulfillment of the potential of all individuals within it equally. As is obvious, neither position can be sustained. All cultures carry within them a diversity of meaning and are based on their own particular power structures which lead to the oppression of the weak within the culture. Hence using culture as the sole argument to reject a universal standard of human rights leaves the oppressed with no place to turn.30 Most feminists however, also recognize that the best check on any state's behavior with respect to people within its territory is international law, especially when a state bases its decision on culture or religion.

DEVELOPED VS. DEVELOPING - THE IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE

Civil and Political vs. Economic and Social

In addition to the challenges to the UDHR from the cultural perspective, there are other significant denials of the universality of the Declaration that come from the ideological debate between the socialist and liberal perspectives. States have posed ideological challenges right from the inception of the General Assembly debate on human rights and the first fifty years of the Declaration have been marked by Cold War politics. The fundamental questions that were asked here, and that have still not been resolved, have to do with the hierarchy of rights. Which rights are more important? Are there some primary rights, or non-derogable rights, without which other human rights become meaningless?

The liberal Western view posits that the civil and political rights of the individual must rank higher than any other rights. These include the “right to life, physical security, due process and non-discrimination on the basis of race and other ascriptive categories.” 31 One of the expressions of these basic rights is the freedom to participate in democratic politics through free and fair elections.32 Scholars argue that unless human beings are allowed the freedom to express themselves, personally as well as politically, there can be no question of human dignity. Fundamentally though, this position rests on the individual expression through private property or, as Tom Farer argues, the removal of state from the “decisions on maters that vitally affect the quality of life of the electorate.” 33

The converse to this approach, usually from the socialist perspective, is the emphasis on the economic and social rights. What price civil liberties, they ask, when people cannot find the means for survival? This approach to human rights is also reflected in the debate on the balance between environment and development.

This divergence of opinion on the hierarchy of rights rests in the different approaches to the role of the individual vis-à-vis the state. For the West, with its emphasis on individual freedom, civil liberties are paramount. For socialist and developing countries the emphasis on economic development in order to raise the standards of the entire society is the driving force.

CONCLUSION

The entire debate on the Declaration has placed the issue of human rights in the center of the political consciousness of the international community. As Philip Allott argues, the ideal of human rights is now part of the international consciousness and cannot easily be dismissed no matter how cynical the players in the international arena. The very statement of these ideals in 1948 created space in the international political system for “a new process of international reality forming.”34

What must also be remembered is that the Declaration itself is a working and living document that sets standards towards which nations can strive. To that extent, the Declaration is universally applicable. There is also a need to recognize and inculcate respect of all persons as human beings. To that extent, the Declaration needs to be broadened. The preamble to the Declaration states best the author's position on the document. It is a tool for teaching and a means of promoting tolerance and respect for all human beings.

The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measure, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of the territories under their jurisdiction.

ENDNOTES

1 Aquinas states that, “since all things subject to divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law,” it is evident that all things partake in some way in the eternal law, insofar as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent way, insofar as it itself partakes of a share of providence both for itself and for others. Therefore it has a share of the eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act or end; and this participation in eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.” See Treatise on Law and Justice, Question 91 Article 2. Pegis, Anton C. (ed.) Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas Vol. 2 (NY: Random House, 1944) p. 750.

2 Even before Hobbes, the idea of contracts as the basis for human society was prevalent in the theories of Francis Hotman and of Theodore Beza. Both the Calvinist and the Jesuit traditions spoke of the first contract as between God and society and then of a second contract between the king and the people. For the Jesuits, this position emerged out of the need to cement the people to the Church rather than to the monarchs who were moving away from the Church. See discussion on contract theorists in Bardat, Leon P. Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997) p. 67-68.

3 ROUSSEAU, Jean Jacques. On The Social Contract. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. p. 46. 4 See the first ten amendments to the US Constitution. 5 MARX,Karl and Freidrich Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977. p.

74.

6 I must state here that I have outlined the development of individual rights from the perspective of Western political thought. A thorough understanding of the historical development of human rights in non-Western thought is subject matter for future research.

7 VON GLAHN, Gerhard. Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996. p. 1.8 Statute of the International Court of Justice in Henkin et al. Basic Documents Supplement to International Law Cases and Materials. St. Paul: West Publishing, 1993. pp.123-133.

9 See the discussion on General Principles as a source of international law in Henkin et al. International Law. St. Paul: West Publications, 1993. pp. 104-113. Also see Friedmann, “The Uses of ‘General Principles' in the Development of International Law,” 57 American Journal of International Law, 279, 1963.

10 I must hasten to add that when taken in conjunction with the general principles argument the Declaration has far greater authority behind it than any other Resolution of the General Assembly. The strength of the Declaration stems from the fact that there were no dissenting votes, albeit there were abstentions.

11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Henkin et al. Basic Documents Supplement. pp. 86-103.12 American Anthropological Association. “Statement on Human Rights.” 49 American Anthropologist, 539 1947. 13 AFSHARI, Reza. “An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse on Human Rights.” Human Rights

Quarterly, 16 May 1994. p 246.14 AFSHARI, p. 267.15 See Mayer, Ann Elizabeth. Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,

1991, and Bielefeldt, Heiner. “Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate.” Human Rights Quarterly, 17.4,

1995. pp. 587-617.

16 Article 18 states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes the freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” See Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Henkin et al. Basic Documents Supplement. pp. 143-146.

17 See Arzt, Donna E. “The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States.” Human Rights Quarterly, 12, 1990. pp. 202-230.

18 AFSHARI, Reza. “An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse on Human Rights.” 245.

19 COHEN, Richard. “Phony Democracies.” Washington Post. January 2, 1991, A:19.

20 The scope of this paper is limited to traditional definitions of gender as male/female. The rights of people who define themselves according to alternate gender categories are not discussed here.

21 Eva Brems argues that there are actually three major groups: the liberal feminists, the cultural feminists and the radical feminists. See “Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human Rights Discourse.” Human Rights Quarterly, 19, 1997. pp. 136-164.

22 See Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright.“Feminist Approaches to International Law.” 85, American Journal of International Law, 613 - 629 as reproduced in Henkin et al. pp. 43 - 47.

23 Article 2.7 of the Charter of the United Nations establishes the principle of domestic jurisdiction stating, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter . Henkin et al. Basic Documents Supplement. p. 2.

24 See ROMANY, Celina. “Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law.” 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 87, 1993, and Rebecca J. Cook. “State Responsibility for Violations of Women's human Rights.” 7, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 125 1994. It should also be stated that international law on children's rights suffers from this same division between domestic jurisdiction and international responsibility.

25 According to Charlesworth et al., “The public realm of the workplace, the law economics politics and intellectual and cultural life, where power and authority are exercised is regarded as the natural province of men, while the private world of the home, the hearth, and children is seen as the appropriate domain of women. The public/private distinction has a normative, as well as a descriptive dimension. Traditionally, the two sphere are accorded asymmetrical value; greater significance I accorded to the male world than to the private, female one”Its reproduction and acceptance in all areas of knowledge have conferred primacy on the male world and supported the dominance of men.” Henkin et al. International Law: Cases and Materials. St. Paul: West Publishing, 1993. p. 45. For further discussion on the effect of personal status laws that affect women's lights see Donna J. Sullivan. “Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward Framework for Conflict Resolution.” 24, NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, 795, 1992.

26 Article 1.1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment o Punishment states “For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inhering in or incidental to lawful sanctions. For full text of the Convention see Henkin et al. Basic Documents Supplement. pp. 180-188.

27 Even among the Western countries, where support for a universal standard is strongest, there are constant debates on issues like abortion and “family values” when the state attempts to cross into the sphere hitherto reserved for the Church or the family.

28 For instance, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination has 94 states parties; India, Pakistan and all the major Islamic republics are not parties to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

29 Perhaps the best response to cultural relativism would be a quote from Robert Bolt. In Bolt's play, A Man for all Seasons, Roper tells Sir Thomas More, Lord Chancellor to Henry VIII, that he would cut down every law in the kingdom to get after the devil. The lawyer in More responds “Oh! And when the last law was down and the devil turned on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country is planted thick with laws - man's laws not God's - and if you cut them down - and you are just the man to do it - do you really think that you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? I'd give the devil the benefit of law for my own safety's sake.”

30 This argument is drawn from the discussion in Tracy E. Higgins. “Anti-Essentialism, Relativism and Human Rights.” Harvard Women's Law Journal, Vol. 19, 1996. pp. 89-126.

31 See FARER, Tom J. “The Hierarchy of Human Rights.” 8 American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 1992. p. 115.

32 In this case the idea of free participation in a democracy subsumes the freedom of speech and assembly.

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33 Farer, Tom J. “The Hierarchy of Human Rights.” p. 118. 34 Allott, Philip. Eunomia: New Order for a New World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. p.288.

REFERENCES

Afshari, Reza. “An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse on Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly, 16 May 1994, p 246.

American Anthropological Association. “Statement on Human Rights.” 49 American Anthropologist 539 (1947).

Arzt, Donna E. “The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States.” Human Rights Quarterly, 12, 1990 pp. 202-230.

Bielefeldt, Heiner. “Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate.” Human Rights Quarterly, 17.4, 1995, pp. 587-617.

Brems, Eva. “Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human Rights Discourse.” Human Rights Quarterly, 19, 1997. pp. 136-164.

Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright. “Feminist Approaches to International Law.” 85 American Journal of International Law, 613 - 629 as reproduced in Henkin et al. pp. 43-47.

Cohen, Richard. “Phony Democracies.” Washington Post, January 2, 1991, A:19.

Cook, Rebecca J. “State Responsibility for Violations of Women's human Rights.” 7 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 125, 1994.

Farer, Tom J. “The Hierarchy of Human Rights.” 8 American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 1992, p. 115.

Friedmann. “The Uses of ‘General Principles' in the Development of International Law.” 57 American Journal of International Law, 279, 1963.

Higgins, Tracy E. “Anti-Essentialism, Relativism and Human Rights.” Harvard Women's Law Journal, Vol. 19, 1996, pp. 89-126.

Marx, Karl and Freidrich Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977. p. 74.

Mayer, Ann Elizabeth. Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Romany, Celina. “Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law.” 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 87, 1993.

Sullivan. Donna J. “Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward Framework for Conflict Resolution.” 24 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, 795, 1992.