Effective Political Representation:
Race Based or Color Blind Districts?
by Professor Vincent DiLorenzo,
School of Law, St. John's University

The United States is a nation of existing and increasing racial and ethnic diversity. Part One of this paper discusses the United States' response in the political arena -- a response taking the form of race-based political districting in the 1980s and then a rejection of that approach and embrace of color-blindness in recent years. Part Two of this paper is a study of policy responsiveness to minority interests. It presents evidence of the policy responsiveness of Congress collectively and of individual members of Congress. It also examines the impact of race-based districting on the legislative voice of black and Hispanic members of Congress. One result has been the creation of a critical mass allowing for a more effective legislative voice for all minority legislators and constituents.

A longer version of this paper was published in William and Mary Law Review July1997, Volume 38, page 1729.

Professor Vincent DiLorenzo, a Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law, teaches Banking Law, Property, Legislative Advocacy and Condominiums, Cooperatives and Homeowner Associations. He holds a B.A. from Pace University and a J.D. from Columbia University where he was a Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar and Associate Articles Editor of the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems. Before coming to St. John's, Professor DiLorenzo taught at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and practiced real-estate and banking law. He has authored many articles and books in the banking, legislation and real estate areas.

PART ONE - United States Approaches

PART TWO - Policy Responsiveness - a Case Study

A. Collective Policy Responsiveness
B. Policy Responsiveness of Individuals

• Proposals for Action
• Advocacy Efforts in Committee and on the Floor
• Anomalous Findings and Post-Redistricting Comparison

C. Legislative Dynamics and Phase Transactions

Implications and Conclusions
Endnotes

PART ONE - United States Approaches

In the early 1980s the voting age population of the United States was 10.5% black, but only 17 of 435 members (3.9%) of the United States House of Representatives were black.¹ Through the 1980s the only black member of Congress elected from any Southern state since Reconstruction was Andrew Young (D. Ga., 1973-77). This lack of representation existed not only in Congress but in some state and local elected bodies. In North Carolina, for example, blacks constituted 22.4% of the population. However, there were only 2 to 4 black members in the 120 member state house of representatives at any given time in the 1971-82 period.² Similarly, there were only 1 or 2 black members in the 50 member state senate at any given time in the 1975-83 period.³

The initial response in the United States was to embrace race-based districting -- for example, creating districts in which a majority of the population was black or Hispanic in order to increase the likelihood that more black or Hispanic members would be elected. This was a policy enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice, and prompted by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Thornburg v. Gingles. In that case the Court found a violation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act when ". . . as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice."⁴

After redistricting based on the 1990 census, the number of black members of Congress increased from 25 to 39. Thirteen of the fourteen new members were elected from minority-majority districts. Similarly, the number of Hispanic members of Congress increased from 11 to 17. All six were elected from minority-majority districts.

In 1993, however, the United States' response changed. In Shaw v. Reno⁵ the United States Supreme Court ruled that minority-majority districts were subject to challenge under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Subsequently, courts have invalidated such districts in North Carolina, Georgia, Texas, Virginia, Louisiana, Florida and New York. Challenges are pending in Illinois and South Carolina. It is not only Congressional districts that have been invalidated. In South Carolina, for example, a federal panel threw out nine state legislative districts in September 1996.⁶

The new approach is one based on color blindness. As Justice O'Connor wrote, in the Court's majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno:

Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief . . . that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters -- a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the nation continues to aspire.⁷

The United States has always rejected the concept of proportional representation. It had embraced the goal of equal opportunity. In the political process that goal was now at odds with the goal of color blindness. My research focuses on the implications of this choice; specifically, on policy responsiveness to minority interests.

PART TWO - Policy Responsiveness: a Case Study

This paper focuses on the policy responsiveness of (a) the United States Congress, collectively, and (b) individual members of Congress to the interests of minority groups. Policy responsiveness, a concept from Hanna Pitkin's work,⁸ is a search for desire and commitment to act in a manner responsive to the interests of minority groups. Black and Hispanic members of the populace are the groups examined.

Past studies have explored policy responsiveness almost exclusively through analysis of roll call voting.⁹ This study attempts to ascertain the strength of responsiveness --desire and commitment -- by examining advocacy efforts. For Congress collectively, this is a study of the proposals or positions, more responsive to minority interests than the existing legal landscape, which were embraced by a majority and which were either enacted or were not enacted for reasons other than desire and commitment (e.g. filibuster). For individual members, this is a study of the advocacy efforts in committee, on the floor, and otherwise, by proposing and pressing legislative proposals. Again, the search is for advocacy of positions more responsive to minority interests than the existing legal landscape.

This study focuses on fair lending enactments and proposals over the last thirty years. These proposals and enactments sought to address discrimination against individuals and discrimination against neighborhoods based on race or ethnic background. Thus, the subject of the study is a civil rights initiative and, in part, a redistributive policy initiative (in the form of community reinvestment).

Collective Policy Responsiveness

The following enactments are the significant actions taken by the Congress on fair lending and the subject of this study:

• 1968 Fair Housing Act (FHA)¹⁰
• 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)¹¹
• 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)¹²
• 1976 Amendment to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ¹³
• 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) ¹⁴
• 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act ¹⁵
• 1989 Amendments to HMDA and CRA ¹⁶
• 1991 Amendments to ECOA ¹⁷

The Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts and amendments were directed at discrimination against individuals. The Community Reinvestment and Home Mortgage Disclosure Acts and amendments were directed at discrimination against neighborhoods. The number of enactments suggests collective policy responsiveness. However, a different picture emerges when one examines the details of the enactments. Examination of the enactments directed at discrimination against individuals reveals weak legislative responsiveness during the 1968-1988 period and, therefore, a slow response overall. This conclusion is based on the very weak enforcement power included in the measures. For example, the 1968 Fair Housing Act contained a broad prohibition against discrimination in the financing of housing, as well as the sale and rental of housing. In that respect it was a gain for minority groups. However, the administrative and enforcement provisions in the Act were weak. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administered the Act but (a) it could not act on its own, but only in response to a complaint, (b) its administrative relief was only "conference, conciliation and persuasion," ¹⁸ and (c) it had to suspend its actions if state or local authorities were addressing the complaint. ¹⁹ The Attorney General also had enforcement authority, but (a) it could only act when there existed a "pattern or practice" of discrimination, and (b) its powers seemed limited to injunctive relief (and not the imposition of penalties).²⁰ Private parties could also enforce the Act, but (a) a 180 day statute of limitations was imposed, (b) resort to HUD proceedings were a prerequisite to the commencement of any civil action, ²¹ and (c) punitive damages were limited to $1,000. ²²

Policy responsiveness must be judged not only in light of the details of the measures enacted but the reasons for such measures - more particularly, was there a general desire for and commitment toward stronger measures? My research indicates that there was not. I return to the 1968 Fair Housing Act as an example. As originally passed by the House, on August 16, 1967, the bill that would ultimately become the 1968 Act (HR 2516) did not contain a fair housing provision.²³ The fair housing provisions were added in a Senate amendment which was identical to an Administration open housing bill. ²⁴ There was a belief that the amendment would lead to defeat of the entire civil rights bill. ²⁵ The bill as amended became subject to a Senate filibuster. That filibuster was able to be stopped only after Senator Mondale, sponsor of the open housing amendment, and Senator Dirksen (minority leader, who had consistently opposed the Mondale amendment) worked out a compromise measure. That compromise omitted the enforcement power which had been given to HUD in the Mondale amendment. ²⁶ When the compromise bill passed the Senate and was sent back to the House, there was support for sending it to conference, where it could be further amended and perhaps the fair housing provisions might be dropped. 44 Ultimately this did not occur.

Thus, Congress was aware of the 1968 FHA's weaknesses. The weaknesses were deliberate--a compromise to avoid complete defeat. Moreover, in both the House and Senate, the compromise was not forced upon a membership strongly committed to a more responsive bill. Rather, it was a membership which was not certain it was committed to any open housing legislation.

The evidence with respect to enactments aimed at discrimination against neighborhoods reveals even less collective policy responsiveness. The enactments were always weak - lacking enforcement measures entirely or containing very weak enforcement provisions. Moreover, there has never been a general desire to strengthen the enactments. Indeed, in recent years the calls have been to rescind them.

The experience with the Community Reinvestment Act is an example. The 1977 Community Reinvestment Act reaffirmed an existing obligation of depository institutions to serve the needs of their communities, although it reemphasized that this included credit needs. The Act also reconfirmed that the federal bank regulatory agencies must assess compliance with this obligation in their examinations. This reconfirmation and emphasis was a gain for minority groups. The deficiencies in the Act were (a) no public disclosure of bank examiners' findings, (b) no private right of action, and (c) no express enforcement obligations imposed on the federal bank regulatory agencies, but instead merely a requirement that they take the bank's community reinvestment record "into account" when evaluating an application for bank expansion.

Moreover, there is no evidence of a collective desire or commitment toward a stronger measure. The Community Reinvestment Act was included in a bill focusing on amendments to the Community Development Act of 1974. The Administration and House bills made no mention of community reinvestment.²⁸ The provision was added by the Senate Banking Committee, in the form that was ultimately adopted.²⁹ There was never a more responsive proposal which came out of the Senate Banking Committee or the Senate itself. The main proponent of the bill, Senator Proxmire, wanted only to reaffirm existing obligations.³⁰ Debate centered on the aid formulas to be used under the Community Development Act and not on the community reinvestment provision. In conference, when a compromise was reached on the aid formula, the House members also accepted the community reinvestment provisions as part of the compromise.

Ten years later, when the Congress was faced with evidence that the 1975 HMDA and 1977 CRA had not worked satisfactorily, Senator Proxmire was still not willing to strengthen the statutes.³²

Thus, when it enacted the CRA, Congress was not interested in a more responsive bill. The House did not even consider a community reinvestment requirement until it emerged in the compromise worked out in conference. The Senate advocates responsible for the measure were not advocates for a more responsive bill. The source materials mention no Congressional criticism of the measure's shortcomings. Criticism came only from trade groups who wanted to remove it entirely.³³

Policy Responsiveness of Individuals

In this second part of the study, a comparison of "legislative heart" of white (non-Hispanic) and black/Hispanic members of Congress is made using two forms of evidence. First, proposals initiated which are more responsive to minority interests than the current or enacted legislative landscape are collected and studied. More responsive proposals would reflect a greater desire and commitment than exists in Congress generally. Second, advocacy efforts in the course of legislative consideration of enacted statutes are explored. These advocacy efforts also permit comparison with the desire and commitment of Congress generally. However, they may also permit comparisons between individual white and black/Hispanic members, in the context of individual legislative initiatives during the course of enactment - a comparison of the efforts made to influence details of an enactment as well as enactment itself.

1. Proposals for Action

The bills introduced in the House and Senate were collected for the period 1967 to June 20 (House) and 21 (Senate), 1996. All bills dealing with the fair lending issues which are the subject of this paper were included. These were identified through the subject index. Bills on related policy issues, such as community development banks or assistance for low income housing, were not included, unless such bills also dealt with fair lending issues.

In preparing the findings, the bill which was enacted into law was excluded, but sponsorship and advocacy of it is separately analyzed below. The enacted legislation formed the baseline for comparison in the session it was enacted and all later sessions. Thus, bills found to be "more responsive" to the interests of minority groups were those that provided a greater scope of coverage or protection or greater remedies than the baseline.

The results are as follows:

Table One reveals interest in fair lending throughout the 1967-96 period, and a consistent commitment on the part of some white members to obtain more responsive legislative enactments. Table Two correlates this interest in more responsive legislation to the total number of black/Hispanic members of Congress (both House and Senate) during four periods - the three periods of legislative turbulence and the recent period after race based redistricting.

No linear correlation is shown between the total number of black and Hispanic members and the total number of more responsive bills. Similarly, no linear correlation is shown between the total number of black and Hispanic members and the percentage of all proposed bills which were more responsive.

However, Tables One and Two reveal an important role of black/Hispanic members in the legislative process in the form of disproportionate commitment. Seventy-two percent of all of the more responsive bills in the 1967-96 period were sponsored by white members only. However, this figure also reveals a disproportionate commitment on the part of black and Hispanic members. During the 1967-96 period, the total black and Hispanic membership of Congress (House and Senate, excluding non-voting delegates) was 1.7 percent in 1967, 4.1 percent ten years later (1977), 5.8 percent twenty years later (1988) and 10.5 percent in recent years (1996), after redistricting. Yet black/Hispanic members sponsored or co-sponsored 41.7% of the more responsive bills in 1967-68, 35.7% of the more responsive bills in 1974-77, 30% of the more responsive bills in 1988-91, and 28% of all of the more responsive bills in the 1967-96 period. The actions do not bear a linear relationship to the number of black/Hispanic members in the 1967-91 period. However, chaos theory's principle of nonlinearity leads us to expect this result.

In addition, the percentage of all bills which were more responsive to minority interests were sponsored predominantly by white members until the Republican and conservative control of Congress occurred in November, 1992. Thereafter, the percentage of more responsive bills sponsored or co-sponsored by black and Hispanic members jumped from the 30-42 percent range to 66 percent.³⁷ This was a period in which such members constituted less than 11 percent of the Congress.

2. Advocacy Efforts in Committee and on the Floor

Looking beyond the number of more responsive bills proposed, it is useful to examine individual advocacy efforts in connection with the fair lending enactments. In addition, it is useful to examine the individuals active in the campaign for the more responsive measures which were reported by committee and thus became part of the legislative agenda (although not enacted). Both are a part of this study.

To examine the advocacy efforts of individual legislators, a search was conducted of the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report for the 1967-96 period. In addition, for the years in which bills were enacted, a search was also conducted of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. All articles discussing fair lending or fair housing initiatives in these two sources formed the source materials. Finally, for all years in which bills were enacted, a search of the Congressional Record was conducted to obtain all statements of all black and Hispanic members of Congress on the pending legislation. These are the "source materials" for this section of the paper as well as the section above discussing the collective responsiveness of the Congress.

One finding is that few black and Hispanic members of the House were identified in the source materials as visible advocates during the 1968-1992 period. During the 1967-68 efforts leading to the Fair Housing Act there were two black or Hispanic members of the Senate and seven black or Hispanic members of the House. However, the only mention of the advocacy efforts of any of these individuals in the source materials is that of Senator Brooke (R. Mass). Senator Brooke's efforts were significant, in that he co-sponsored an open housing bill which was opposed by the Republican leadership.

The 1974-77 period saw the passage of four fair lending measures. In the 1974-77 period there were two black or Hispanic Senators and 19-20 black or Hispanic members of the House. However, the only advocacy effort for more responsive legislation contained in the source materials was that of Senator Brooke. A few black/Hispanic members spoke in favor of the fair lending legislation, but only in general terms - not the sort of activity which would distinguish their efforts from any other member who voted for passage. Again, Senator Brooke's efforts were noteworthy. For example, Senator Brooke, the only black member of the Senate in 1975, was the only Republican on the Senate Banking Committee to vote to approve the Proxmire bill (which became HMDA) instead of a proposal by Republican Senator Jake Garn to simply require the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to study redlining problems in selected cities.³⁹ Just as he had done in connection with the 1968 Fair Housing Act, Senator Brooke was willing to ignore party positions in order to support measures more protective of minority interests than those party positions would have allowed.

The 1988-91 period, saw the passage of three fair lending measures. In the 1988-91 period there were no black or Hispanic Senators and 31-36 black or Hispanic members of the House (excluding non-voting delegates) -- with seven of these members joining the House after 1989. During this period the source materials identified many white members of the House as visible advocates for responsive measures. The source materials also identified only Henry Gonzalez and Maxine Waters as strong advocates. Of course, there were many general statements of support by other black/Hispanic members in the Congressional Record. However, it was not more than would be expected of any supporter of the bills.

The same evidence exists when examining advocacy efforts with regard to the four more responsive legislative proposals which were part of the legislative agenda in the 1967-96 period -- i.e. were reported out of committee but were not enacted. These legislative agenda items were considered in 1980, 1988 and 1990. Black and Hispanic members of Congress were active only with regard to the 1988 legislative proposal - with one Hispanic member and one black non-voting delegate (from the District of Columbia) serving as advocates.

3. Anomalous Findings and Post-Redistricting Comparison

These conclusions regarding the advocacy efforts of black and Hispanic members of Congress in committee and on the floor in the 1967-92 stand in contrast to findings regarding the disproportionate number of more responsive bills introduced. They also contrast with the higher voting record ratings of black and Hispanic members of Congress which have been consistently reported.

Carol Swain⁴⁰, for example, found that in the 100th Congress AFL-CIO Cope ratings and Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) ratings of black and white members of the House were:

I decided to explore the advocacy efforts of black and Hispanic members further during the period following the 1992 redistricting and elections. The first session following the 1992 elections in which fair lending was a serious legislative agenda item was in 1994. First, Congress was considering an interstate bank branching bill. Consumer groups wanted to include enhanced community reinvestment requirements in the bill. It is revealing that they viewed the House Banking Committee as having a more liberal and urban-oriented membership that was sympathetic to their interests - more sympathetic than the Senate Banking Committee.⁴¹ The pro-consumer fight included proposals to have banks benefiting from interstate branching to (a) make specific promises to make more loans in underdeveloped neighborhoods under the CRA, and, (b) be required to provide basic banking and check-cashing services. Another proposal would deny new interstate branching powers to banks that had shown a previous pattern of closing branches in low and moderate income areas. These were proposals more responsive to minority interests than the bill which was enacted. The pro-consumer fight was led by Joseph Kennedy (D. Mass.), Kweisi Mfume (D. Md.) and Maxine Waters (D. Calif.).⁴² In addition, Cleo Fields (D. La.) was an active advocate in committee for the second of these more responsive proposals.⁴³ For the first time, a majority of the advocates in committee -- indeed, three out of four -- were black members.

A second, fair lending proposal on the legislative agenda in 1994 was a bill to combat insurance redlining. Past fair lending initiatives targeted banks and mortgage companies. This 1994 initiative targeted insurance companies and this additional barrier to equal availability of credit. The House approved a bill in July, 1994 after Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard (D. Calif.) unsuccessfully attempted to strengthen the measure through a floor amendment.⁴⁴ Two bills had been reported. One was reported by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and the floor manager was Representative Cardiss Collins (D. Ill.).⁴⁵ A stronger bill had been reported by the newly constituted House Banking Committee, with strong support from chairman Henry Gonzalez (D. Texas) and Representative Joseph Kennedy (D. Mass.). Once again three of the four advocates in the attack against insurance redlining identified by the source materials were black or Hispanic members.

When the interstate banking bill reached and was approved by the House in August 1994, it was a clean bill. It did not contain additional measures, including additional CRA requirements. In the brief House debate on the measure, the House members mentioned as lamenting this fact were Joseph Kennedy II (D. Mass.) and Kweisi Mfume (D. Md.).⁴⁷

Admittedly, the evidence of black and Hispanic members becoming numerically more significant, even a majority, of the identified advocates of more responsive fair lending proposals is limited. Activity which could be studied occurred only in 1994. Further study would be useful.

Legislative Dynamics and Phase Transactions

I offer an explanation for the results uncovered in this study from the world of chaos theory. Chaos theory posits a world of nonlinear relationships between causes and effects. Thus, addition of each additional black or Hispanic member of Congress is not expected to cause and does not cause a linear increase in the legislative voice of such members. However, at some point a critical mass is achieved which causes the legislative voice of the entire group to change (a phase transition).

Achieving a critical mass is particularly important in the House. Richard Fenno has documented that policy individualism is actually reinforced by conditions in the Senate. In the House it is less likely to be allowed, either on the floor or in committee.⁴⁸ Moreover, individual House member's influence on chamber decisions occurs almost entirely within and through committees.⁴⁹ A policy initiative strongly favoring minority interests, which is not supported by the House or by a noticeable portion of committee members often does not receive attention -- being characterized as merely policy individualism. An initiative at least favored by a sizable number of committee members is typically needed for committee attention - i.e. a critical mass to demand attention. The size of that critical mass will vary from committee to committee, and it may certainly include white members who may favor far more responsive initiatives than the House generally may favor. However, one or several members will not create that critical mass.

Table Three charts the size of the House committees which considered the fair lending legislation which is the subject of this study, and the number of black and Hispanic members of these committees. It also charts the membership of such committees after the 1992 elections. After the 1992 elections black and Hispanic membership of the House Banking Committee exceeded twenty percent for the first time.

Chaos theory teaches us that effects are nonlinear. A change in number of minority members from three in 1976 to six in 1989 does not translate into a doubling of impact on committee viewpoint. Similarly, a rise from six in 1989 to 11 in 1993 does not translate into another doubling of the original level of impact. Instead, not only are effects nonlinear, but at some point a transition phase is passed and the effect (impact) becomes different in nature. The same would be true in reverse -- as members are lost.

Implications and Conclusions

The tension between the goals of equal opportunity and color blindness leads to a need to make enormously difficult choices. In the U.S. political arena, the choice of color blindness may lead to a silencing of the legislative voice of all minority members if the number of such members falls below a critical mass. The United States experience prior to race-based redistricting provides evidence of this consequence.
As a result, a re-examination of that choice may be necessary.

In part, this consequence flows from the structure of the legislative body. It results from the House structure -- a large body which has imposed internal operating structures to deal with that size, but which smother policy individualism. The same would be true of state or local legislative bodies which in operation or structure -- e.g. leadership control -- deprive individual members of a legislative voice. Nationally, the structure of the House will not change, but procedures may be altered. Locally, both structures and procedures might be re-examined.

ENDNOTES

1. Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 2000 (1996) (dissenting opinion of Justice Souter). return to paragraph

2. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 40, 116 S.Ct. 2752, 2761 (1986). return to paragraph

3. Id. return to paragraph

4. Id. 478 U.S. at 44. return to paragraph

5. 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).return to paragraph

6."9 Legislative Districts Ruled Unconstitutional by Judges," N.Y. Times, September 25, 1996 at A19. return to paragraph

7. 509 U.S. at 657. return to paragraph

8. Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 209 - 210 (1967). return to paragraph

9. Rodney E. Hero and Caroline J. Tolbert, "Latinos and Substantive Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives: Direct, Indirect, or Nonexistent?,"39 A. M. J. Pol. SCI. 640 - 652 (1995); Carol Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests (1993). See also L. Marvin Overby and Kenneth M. Cosgrove, Unintended consequences? Racial Redistricting and the Representation of Minority Interests, 58 J. Pol 540 (1996). Carol Swain's study also used interviews, observations in the field and historical analysis to draw some of its conclusions.return to paragraph

10. Pub. L. 90-284, Title VIII (1968). return to paragraph

11. Pub. L. 93-495, Title V (1974). return to paragraph

12. Pub. L. 94-200, Title III (1975). return to paragraph

13. Pub. L. 94-239 (1976). return to paragraph

14. Pub. L. 95-128, Title VIII (1977). return to paragraph

15. Pub. L. 100-430 (1988). return to paragraph

16. Pub. L. 101-73, sec. 1211 and 1212 (1989). return to paragraph

17. Pub. L. 102-242, sec. 223 (1991). return to paragraph

18. Pub. L. 90-284, sec. 810(a) and (d). return to paragraph

19. Id. sec. 810(b). return to paragraph

20. Id. sec. 813. return to paragraph

21. Id. sec. 812(a). return to paragraph

22. Id. sec. 812(c). return to paragraph

23.1967 Cong. Q. Almanac 778. return to paragraph

24.Congress Enacts Open Housing Legislation, 1968 Cong. Q. Almanac 152, 156-57 return to paragraph

25.Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield stated: "I don't think we have the votes for an open housing amendment and if we got into a fight on that, it would endanger the chances of Title V (HR 2516) which is in trouble enough as it is." Id. at 156. return to paragraph

26.Id., at 158-59. The final cloture voted required and was able to secure exactly the 65 votes needed. Id. at 160 return to paragraph

27. Id. at 164-65 (discussing actions of the Rules Committee and division among House Republicans.). Most observers believed the bill would have been weakened in conference and that Senate opponents might be able to delay or obstruct a vote on accepting a conference report, thus killing the legislation.

28. Id. at 164. $12.5 Billion Urban Aid Authorization Voted, 1977 Cong Q. Almanac 126, 130-32. return to paragraph

29. Id. at 133. return to paragraph

30.As Senator Proxmire stated:

"[the section was included] to reaffirm that banks and thrift institutions are indeed chartered to serve the convenience and needs of their communities and needs does not just mean drive-teller windows and Christmas Club accounts. It means loans." Senate Extends Urban Aid, Housing Programs, 35 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 1193, 1194 (1977). return to paragraph

31. Compromise Reached on Urban Aid Bill, 35 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 2079, 2080. See also, $12.5 Billion Urban Aid Authorization Voted, 1977 Cong Q. Almanac 126, 136-37 (describing deadlock over aid formula).

32. John R. Cranford, Banks Upset by Price Tag on Deregulation Bill, Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 796-797 (1988). return to paragraph

33. The provision had been the subject of an intensive lobbying effort and scare campaign by some trade associations. Senate Extends Urban Aid Housing Programs, 35 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 1193, 1194 (1977). return to paragraph

34. In the 1967-89 period the source was Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions. In the 1990-96 period the source was Commerce Clearing House Congressional Index.

35. The initial period is both 1967 and 1968, although legislation was enacted only in 1968, because consideration of the bill spanned the 1967-68 period and because any one-year only interval may yield a distorted picture.

36. This disproportionate commitment was also found by Cobb and Jenkins in their study of bills sponsored in the 103rd Congress which offered symbolic benefits to blacks, direct or indirect social benefits, and direct or indirect economic benefits. They found that black members of Congress constituted 57% of the sponsors of bills providing symbolic benefits; 52% of the sponsors of bills providing direct social benefits; 66% of the sponsors of bills providing direct economic benefits; as well as 21% and 37% of the sponsors of bills providing indirect social and indirect economic benefits, respectively. Michael D. Cobb and Jeffrey A. Jenkins, Who Represents Black Interests in Congress? Sponsoring and Voting for Legislation Beneficial to Black Constituents, Paper presented at 1996 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 18-20, 1996.

37. The small number of bills in the 1993-96 period might be responsible for this change. However, the 1990-92 period, which preceded Republican control of Congress, also had a small number of bills, yet 80% of the bills were more responsive, and 50% of the more responsive bills were sponsored only by white members of Congress. return to paragraph

38. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Congress 49 Cong. Q. Wkly Rep. 108-A, 109-A (1991).

39. Redlining Disclosure, 33 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 1147 (1975). return to paragraph

40. Swain, note 9, supra, at 234-5 and 57. return to paragraph

41. Andrew Taylor, With Major Hurdle Gone, Prospects For Branching Bill Look Bright, 52 Cong. Q. Wkly Rep. return to paragraph

425 (1994).

42. Andrew Taylor, What Opponents Seek, 52 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 462 (1994). return to paragraph

43.Andrew Taylor, Bill to Allow Interstate Branching Cruises Through House Panel, 52 Cong. Q. Wkly Rep. 589 (1994). return to paragraph

44. George Hager, House Approves Energy Panel's Bill on Insurance Redlining, 52 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 2010 (1994).

45. Id. return to paragraph

46. Id.

47.David S. Cloud, House Approves Interstate Community Lending Bills, 52 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 2230 (1994). return to paragraph

48 . . . the policy individualism of the Senate group surely is the more solidly reinforced by conditions in its parent chamber. As a strategic premise, policy individualism is more likely to be adopted by Senate than by House committees. And where it is adopted by a Senate committee, it will be that much easier to implement. return to paragraph

Richard F. Fenno Jr., Congressmen in Committees 170 (1973). See also Id. at 146 -7 (comparing policy individualism and impact on decision making by the chamber, in Senate versus House).

49 . . . decision making inside the Senate is much less of a committee-dominated process than it is in the House. For where it becoms necessary, as in the House, to circumscribe the activity of individual members and rely on fairly inflexible procedures and where the countervailing pressures toward individualism are of only modest intensity, the tendency to rely on formal collectivities for decision making is strong. And this tendency, of course, magnifies the importance of committees. In the House, the individual memberís influence on chamber decisions is exerted, almost wholly, within and through his committees. Senators operate within no such constraints. Id. at 147. return to paragraph

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